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Summary  findings
Hammer  applies  to the  health  sector  an approach  to  Mtinistries of health  may shift  their  own  resources  away
analyzing  projects  advocated  in a recent  paper  by  trom  activities  that  are funded  by project  to those  that
Devarajan,  Squire,  and Suthiwart-Narueput.  In the health  are not  evaluated  at all. Project  outputs  depend  on the
sector,  a project  evaluation  should:  incentives  for  civil servants  to provide  good  service - a
Establish  a firm  justification  for public  involvement.  consideration  rarely  taken  into  account  in project
Hammer  identifies  a number  of common  failures  in the  evaluations.
markets  for  both  health  services  and  insurance  but  argues  Hammer  concludes  that  much  of the  analysis relevant
that  this should  be the startinig  place  for economic  to projects  should  be done  before  project  evaluation.  If
analysis,  not  a reason  to ignore  economics.  the issues  of fungibility  and  incentives  are  given due
- Establish  the counterfactual:  what  happens  with and  respcCt,  the  donors'  best  form  of  intervention  may  not  be
without  the  project.  Project  outputs  should  he predicted  traditional  projects  at all but  rather  general  loans with
net of the reaction  of consumers  and  providers  in the  conc'itions  related  to general  sector  strategy  and  reform.
private  sector.  This  requires  knowledge  of  the market  lFor a standard  project,  a fair amount  of  information
structure  (supply,  demand,  and  equilibrium)  for health  from  supporting  sector  work  is needed  before  evaluation.
services.  If clinical  services  (or  anything  depending  on people's
D  Determine  the fiscal effect  of the project.  rhe  issue  behavior)  are part  of the  project,  information  is needed
of  appropriate  levels for  fees should  be  handled  jointly  about  thie supply  and  demand  for  substitute  services.  The
with  project  evaluation.  market  structure  of health  care is an essential  part  of the
*  Acknowledge  the fungibiliry  of  project  resources  backgrouind  work.
and examine  the  incentives  facing  puHlic servants.
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In a recent article, Devarajan,  Squire,  and Sethaput-Narueput  (henceforth  DSS for
obvious reasons)  discuss considerations  that should  be taken into account  in order to improve  the
economic  analyses  of projects in general.  They  suggest  that an analysis  of a project and its
supporting  sector  work should  do four main  things:
(1) First and foremost,  it should  establish  a firm rationale  for the  public involvement  in
the sector and the provision  of project outputs;
(2) It should  be able to establish  the counterfactual  to the project,  i.e., to determine  what
happens in the nongovernmental  sectors  with and without  the project;
(3) It should identify  the fiscal impact  of the project, since  public funds  to finance
projects  come at a premium  due to the distortionary  effects  of the taxes needed  to raise
them; and
(4) It should  consider  the possibility  that loaned  funds  are fungible  between  uses and
therefore that the real effect of any given  loan is not from the identified  project but from
a totally different  one, chosen  by government  (either centrally  or within  line agencies),
and made  possible by the additional  funds.
This paper  discusses  selected  issues  of project evaluation  in the health sector  with
particular  attention  to the concerns  raised  in DSS. It is not, therefore,  a complete  treatment  of
2how to do project  evaluation  in health. For a discussion  of methods  of assessing  costs of inputs
and estimating  the direct outputs  of a project  there is a large body of literature  available.I  Rather,
this paper focuses  on the new  directions  suggested  in DSS. In the first section,  characteristics  of
health which make  these new directions  most relevant  to the sector are discussed.  Next, issues in
assessing  the counterfactual  to the project are discussed.  The third section is a discussion  of the
fiscal effects of expenditures,  emphasizing  the interrelated  decisions  of providing  services  and
collecting appropriate  fees, if any.
The fourth section  deals with issues  of fungibility  in the use of funds in the public sector
as applied to health. It leads  to a broader  issue which  was not emphasized  in DSS  but which is
implicit in approaches  which take the decisions  of government  as endogenous:  that of assessing
incentives  in the provision  of services  in the public sector.  Together  with the first three concerns,
this one underscores  the conclusion  in DSS that a great deal more  economic  analysis  is needed in
establishing  the value of health projects  but that the bulk of this analysis  should  be in the context
of a supporting  analysis  of health markets  and less in the evaluation  of individual  projects.
I. Rationale  for Public  Sector  Involvement  in Health
As stressed  in DSS, the policy environment  for projects  today is considerably  different
than that of the late 1960s  when the basic ideas  of contemporary  project  evaluation  were
formulated.  At that time, economies  in the developing  world were highly  distorted  as a result of
government  policies  (inward-looking  protectionist  policies and heavily regulated  or directly
controlled  industry)  and it was assumed  that the government  would  take a leading  role in the
industrial  sectors.  The project evaluation  literature  emerged  as a way to help governments  make
'See, for example,  Over  (1991)  and  the  references  included  there.
3socially  profitable  investment  decisions  without  addressing  the question  of whether  these
activities should  be in public  hands.
The  world has changed  significantly  since  then. Many  countries  have liberalized  their
policies and have become  more market  oriented.  The absolute  level of distortions  due to taxes,
trade barriers,  and regulations  have fallen and many countries,  including  those which had been
centrally  planned,  have more active  and competitive  private sectors in industry,  manufacturing,
and agriculture.  The premise  that the government  will be carrying  out or ruling  on all investment
projects  is no longer  true (if it ever  was).
Our analytic  techniques  of project  evaluation  should  adapt to take into account  this
changed  environment.  Government  investment,  as with any government  intervention,  should  be
justified in terms of the benefit  the project would have  for society  over and above  that which
would take place without  the public sector.  For any investment  opportunity,  the focus of analysis
should  be on the difference  between  social and private benefit  - not the costs and expected
returns to private goods.
The standard  way to assess this benefit  would  be to identify  the market  failures  which
characterize  the private sector  equilibrium  and, preferably,  to quantify  the welfare loss from
those failures.  Priorities  for investments  should  be based on the degree  to which  they ameliorate
these losses.
On this criterion,  the health sector  as a whole is on firmer ground  than industrial  and
commercial  sectors and would  probably  be favored  if this criterion  were applied  even-handedly
across  public portfolios.  Taking  a "health project"  to mean any investment  in which  the
improvement  of people's health status is an important  output,  such projects  comprise  a mixed
bag of activities, some under  the traditional  jurisdiction  of ministries  of health;  others, such as
sanitation  and safe water, often  are the responsibility  of other  ministries.  They  are a mixed bag in
4a different sense as well. Components  of health projects  span the spectrum  from almost  pure
public goods  to almost  pure private goods  with services  having  various  degrees  of market failure
in between.  It is worth revisiting  some of the major market  failures  associated  with the sector
and how projects  can be used to ameliorate  them. This is well-worked-over  territory2  and only a
few points need  to be made.
While  much has been  made of the "epidemiological  transition,"  i.e.,  the shift of causes of
mortality  from infectious  diseases  to noncommunicable,  chronic  diseases  characteristic  of richer
countries,  infectious  diseases  are still responsible  for a large fraction  of deaths  in poor countries
and within  poorer groups  in those countries.  These  types of diseases  make  a prima facie case for
government  intervention  on three grounds.  First,  they are  themselves  perfect  examples  of
problems  with distinct  externalities  - even with a good reason  to seek medical  care, people with
such a disease  may not seek care quickly  enough for social benefits  (in preventing  spread of the
disease)  and they may be less likely  to complete  a full course  of treatment  than is socially
optimal.  The consequence  of a decision  to discontinue  taking  drugs,  either to save on the cost of
paying for them or for suffering  side effects,  can lead to resurgence  of the disease  - and the
attendant  increase  in transmission  - as well as increased  risk of promoting  resistance  to known
drugs.  This effect is not confined  to curative  measures.  Recent research  on the use of pesticide-
treated  bednets in the Gambia  has shown  a decrease  in incidence  of malaria  among  those who do
not use the bednets  (Tropical  Disease  Research  Program 1995).  Similarly,  while the main
beneficiary  of immunization  is the child who is actually  immunized,  for some diseases,
transmission  is affected  by the number  of children  who are immunized,  thereby  conferring  an
external  benefit.
2An  extensive  discussion  is found  in Musgrove  (forthcoming)  or see  WHO  (1993).
5Second, some of the policy options available to combat infectious diseases are in the
nature of almost pure public goods. Vector control (pests - mosquitoes, rats, snails that carry
schistosomiasis, etc.) is sometimes a pure public good, meaning that people cannot be excluded
from benefiting from a service even if they refuse to pay for it. Therefore the service cannot
possibly be provided by the private sector. Another type of public good in the health sector
involves the collection and dissemination of information. Epidemiological surveillance for
disease control, its supporting laboratories, and laboratories to monitor safe food, drugs, and
water are a central government responsibility. A recent project in Malaysia helped build and
develop national laboratories to improve epidemiological surveillance capabilities and to monitor
food and drug quality (World Bank 1994, Malaysia).
Finally, infectious diseases disproportionately affect the poor and are one of the scourges
of poverty. Table  1 shows the distribution of mortality by different causes across different
income groups among adult women in China. As is clearly apparent, while poorer people have
higher mortality from all causes, the proportion by which the poor die relative to nonpoor is very
much higher for infectious than for noncommunicable diseases (a factor of 3.5 for the former and
1.3 for the latter). If this table were extended to all age groups (particularly children), the relative
effects of the types of diseases would be similar though the communicable disease component
would rise relative to noncommunicable diseases. Basic principles of targeting (Besley and
Kanbur 1993) and common sense would indicate that, all else held equal (such as costs), any
reallocation from infectious disease control (or even injury prevention) to noncommunicable
disease control would hurt the poor disproportionately. 3
3Oddly,  that is not the conclusion  drawn  in the paper presenting  the data..
6Table 1. Female  adult mortality  rates  by cause  of death and income
(entries are the probability  of dying between  the ages of 15 and 60)
Income  quartile  Communicable  Noncommunicable  Injuries
diseases  diseases
Richest  .4  6.7  1.2
2  .4  7.9  2.0
3  .6  7.6  2.4
Poorest  1.4  8.9  2.7
Source: Adapted from Murray et al (1992).
The Infectious  and Endemic  Disease  Control  Project  in China  (World  Bank 1992,  China)
exploits  this complementarity  of efficiency  (externality-reducing)  and poverty  alleviation  effects
of infectious  disease  control.  This project focuses  on tuberculosis  and schistosomiasis  control in
rural areas.  Tuberculosis,  in particular,  is a virulently  communicable  disease  that fits the
description  of individual  behavior  with externalities  perfectly.  The drug  treatment available  is
effective  but expensive.  People  feel better and tend to want to stop  treatment long before  the
course of drugs is completed.  This runs the risk of resurgence  of the disease,  resumed
infectiousness  for other people  and increased  resistance  of the disease  to available  drugs.
The second set of market  failures  revolve  around  the key characteristic  of the sector:
problems  of uncertainty  and incomplete  information.  This reason for intervention  is commonly
raised but should  be used with a great deal of caution depending  on context.  There is no such
thing as "complete"  information  in any market.  We rarely know  everything  about any product
that we buy and we should  be wary of using this argument  too freely.  If the real problem  of, say,
low use of medical  services  is imperfect  information  on the part of consumers,  one might ask
why simple  messages in an information  campaign  would  not be sufficient  to deal with it. If
people do not change  their behavior  with the information,  we might  want to reconsider  whether
7we are talking about a market  failure in health or simply  differences  in opinion  about  the value of
goods  and services.
This being  said, imperfect  information  takes  a few specific forms in the health field.
First, particularly  for things in which there is no marketable  product  associated  with a preventive
health action (such as the value of washing  hands  after defecation  or of wearing  long sleeves  in
the evening [to protect against  malaria])  such that private advertising  could be relied upon, there
may be no mechanism  for delivering  sufficient  information.  One might wonder  why media such
as radio or newspapers  don't cover  this adequately.  This is an empirical  matter,  conditional  on
the extent of freedom  of the press and literacy.
A second  area in which imperfect  information  is a common  problem  in health is the
4 natural asymmetry  of information  in curative  health services. Sometimes  referred  to as
"supplier-induced  demand,"  this problem  relates to the fact that medical  practitioners  know more
about  health problems  than do patients (which  is why the patients solicited  their help in the first
place). The problem  arises when the practitioner  has other (usually  financial)  motives  in
undertaking  the transaction  than helping  the consumer.  This is a classic  example  of the
"principal-agent"  problem  in economics  and can induce  socially  suboptimal  behavior  in the
medical  services  market in the sense that some government  intervention  will exist which can
improve  efficiency.  While many  people have  modeled  some aspect  of this problem  (usually  with
a lot of specific  institutional  features  in the U.S. or the U.K. context)  there are few examples  of
good models  for this problem  in general or for the developing  world.
4 "Curative"  in this case  means  clinic-based,  patient-initiated  services.  The  distinction  between  curative  and
preventive,  while  perfectly  clear  to nonmedical  people,  appears  to be controversial  in the  health  field.
8Most critical for the functioning of the sector is the problem of catastrophic loss and
therefore the role (and frequent failure) of insurance markets and their interaction with medical
care markets. 5 Routine care is not necessarily a big problem for people to handle from their own
budgets. It is the infrequent but financially devastating incidents that are of concern here.
Expenditures on health care in all countries are extremely skewed, that is, a quite small
proportion of the population accounts for a large fraction of total expenditure or, equivalently,
that expenditures for most people in most years are small. Insurance markets may fail to exist for
several well known reasons. The most important is adverse selection in which those who know
they are likely to need care will buy insurance, those who don't expect to need it may not. This
drives up the cost of coverage for those who self-select to buy insurance. The then-higher premia
needed to cover the cost might then drive out others who are relatively healthy (and therefore
don't want the insurance at the higher price) and the entire market may unravel. The other main
problem deals with moral hazard - in this case not on the part of the patient necessarily (who
has good reasons to want to stay healthy independently of insurance coverage) but of service
providers. They might charge more or over-treat in order to get reimbursed from a third party
with less ability to monitor the specific care delivered. This effect may also lead to suboptimal
coverage due to insurers' refusal to insure for certain types of illnesses, treatments, or patients.
The absence of a well functioning insurance market means that large numbers of people
who would be willing to pay the actuarially fair rate to protect themselves from the financial
burden of expensive illnesses (with known treatments) are prevented from doing so. The welfare
loss associated with this market failure will be largest in the cases of relatively rare health
problems (since low probability events have low expected costs) and of very expensive
procedures (since this increases demand from risk-averse consumers) (Hammer and Berman
5The  central  role of insurance  in the medical  market  has been  emphasized  by Griffin  (1990).
91995). The unpredictable nature of demand for health care, combined with the widespread
absence of insurance is a key feature leading to large discrepancies between social and private
benefits from care as observed in markets. A particularly under-researched element in health
economics in developing countries is the latent demand for medical insurance (as opposed to
medical care)6 and the efficiency loss induced by its absence.
Finally, the health sector is frequently called on to help in the alleviation of poverty. This
justification  of public intervention in health needs to be treated with care. In general, the type of
goods which are the best vehicles for redistribution (via subsidized services) are those that have
very low (preferably negative) income elasticities - i.e., they should be things that poor people
consume relatively more of than others. While it is true that poor people's  health is worse than
other people's,  it is generally not true that they demand more health care than others. In fact, it is
more often the case that income elasticities for expenditures on health care are very high -
usually greater than I and often around 1.5. This means that relatively rich people spend a higher
fraction of their income on health care than do the poor. Across-the-board subsidization of
services would transfer money toward the wealthy. Citing examples from China, Cote d'lvoire,
Indonesia, Peru, and Tanzania, van der Gaag (1995) notes that many public health systems, while
often justified on the basis of ensuring equity, tend to provide higher subsidies to the relatively
affluent. Solon et al (1991) show that in the Philippines, high income people receive much more
of the marginal dollar spent on public health facilities than they pay of the marginal dollar
collected in taxes.
6 An exception  is the recent  experiment  in Indonesia  conducted  by the RAND  Corporation.  See Gertler  and
Molyneaux  (1995).
10On the other  hand, as seen above,  prevention  of infectious  disease  will usually  help the
poor more  than others. Therefore,  the wide variety of services  have an equally  wide variety  of
effects on different  income groups.  Before  interventions  in the health sector  are designed  with
poverty  alleviation  as an objective,  the ultimate  beneficiaries  need to be carefully  examined.
There are  just too many  kinds of health subsidies  that will have  a perverse  incidence.
The fact that market failures  exist is not a justification  for just any intervention.  It is also
not a reason for ignoring  economic  analysis  but rather is the reason  why careful analysis  is
needed.  When markets  work  well,  the standard  prescription  of laissez-faire  policies is adequate.
It is precisely  when they don't that you need  to take a closer  look. Unfortunately,  the fact that
markets  do not work  well in the sector  has not been  used as a starting  point  for a more detailed
analysis  of how they fail and what can most effectively  improve  welfare. This would  require
more attention  on the behavior  of consumers,  of providers,  and of the markets for medical  care
and insurance  in order to assess how big a problem  the market  failures  are and how much
government  intervention  can improve  matters.
Some methods  of analysis  which have  been proposed  for use in the sector  do not address
these key characteristics  of the health market.  In spite  of the recognition  that the public sector
should  not rely on the concept  of the cost-effectiveness  of medical  procedures  as an allocative
criterion  (World  Bank 1993,  p. 65),  the 1993 World  Development  Report  presents  calculations
that rely on this concept,  one that bears no resemblance  to the concerns  expressed  here.  In that
methodology,  the ratio of clinical  benefits  to procedure  costs are calculated  and the higher  the
ratio, the higher  the priority  of the use of  public money  granted  the medical  intervention.  No
consideration  is given  to infectious  disease  (or any other externality)  or the degree  with which a
private sector  might substitute  for the public,  and no extra advantage  is given  to problems  which
disproportionately  hurt the poor. As to the treatment  of risk and uncertainty,  the cost-
11effectiveness approach 7 gets things backwards. If the main market failure in a particular context
is the faulty insurance market, the highest priority items for government intervention from a
welfare improving point of view should be relatively expensive items, holding possible health
benefits constant. This, of course, is inversely related to the criterion of publicly funding the
most cost-effective procedures. 8
The discussion above illustrates how private markets in health are subject to serious
potential failures. It also points to the need to analyze behavior: people's (as patients as well as
in trying to avoid becoming sick), providers' and potential insurers'; and how this behavior leads
to those failures. Balancing this list of potential problems with the private sector is the mirror
image set of concerns regarding the public provision of services. Just as markets fail, so do
government bureaucracies. Just as the behavior of private agents needs to be examined in order
to judge how serious these failures may be, so too does the behavior of civil servants delivering
health related services. The issue of monitoring quality and providing appropriate incentives
within the public sector is left in the concluding section of the paper.
II. Establishing  the Counterfactual
After establishing a strong rationale for public involvement, the second goal of economic
analysis advocated in DSS is to assess what would happen with and without the project. Three
7As  well as the other  method  of prioritization  - the burden  of disease.  Here,  priorities  are given  to the
biggest  causes  of death  (regardless  of the ability  to do anything  about them).  Besides  being irrelevant  to
decisionmaking  - resources  should  be allocated  according  to marginal  benefits  not total  possible  returns
unless  strong  economies  of scale can be demonstrated  - this  criterion  for ranking  priorities  is also
backwards.  The types of conditions  most likely  to be left out of the market  due to insurance  market  failures
are rare, not common.
s This is discussed  in more detail in Hammer  and Berman  (1995).
12characteristics  of the health sector  make the concerns  expressed  in DSS particularly  germane.
These are:
(1) health care in most developing  countries  is characterized  by a substantial  private
sector  alongside  a large  public sector,
(2) as a service  sector,  health is largely a nontraded  good and,
(3) a primary  output  of the sector,  health status, is difficult  to value in monetary  terms
leading to a need  to carefully,  and separately,  account  for this one component  of the net
output of the project.
The following  line of argument  shows  that these three characteristics  make the points in
DSS particularly  relevant  to health. First (point  3), it is unlikely  that we will ever agree on a
measure  of the value of life and will always  need to keep separate  account  of the health effects of
a project rather than aggregating  them into a single  summary  monetary  measure  with other
project components. The health effect will be related to the actual level of consumption  of
services  (as opposed  to the value of consumption  of tradable  goods  in a standard  analysis).  As a
nontraded  good, consumption  is equal  to production  and with a competing  private sector,
nontraded  good production  can "crowd  out" (or "in," possibly)  private  production  (points 1 and
2) leaving net changes  in consumption  to be the topic of analysis.
Therefore,  establishing  the "counterfactual"  requires  explicit  modeling  of demand  for
and (nongovernmental)  supply  of services.  To some extent,  this underscores  the point made
concerning  pinpointing  the market  failure motivating  the project. Here,  though, rather than  being
13used as a means of providing basic justification of the project, determining the behavior of the
system lets us know the actual outcome of adding capacity to a market with an active private
sector. The standard project evaluation literature takes nontraded goods into account by
modifying the prices  at which project outputs are valued (the price capturing the net effect of
project output on total market output). In health, the reluctance to use prices on outputs such as
lives saved means that the net contribution should be calculated explicitly. The behavior of
providers in the private sector should also be analyzed to see if there are opportunities for
improving services through regulation or subsidy which may be less expensive than direct,
public, provision. Some elaboration of these points follows.
The  private sector in health. As the following table makes clear, a large private sector is
the rule in health care and is generally larger the poorer the country (with the likely
underestimation of the use of traditional healers, the true relationship is probably more
pronounced). This gives a strong presupposition that the reaction of the private sector to public
provision is necessary in assessing the net impact of the latter.
Table 2. Public and private shares of health expenditures
Region  Percentage of total health expenditures
Public  Private
Established market economies  61  39
Middle East  57  43
Former socialist economies  71  29
India  22  78
China  59  41
Other Asia and the Pacific  39  61
Islands
Latin America and the  61  39
Caribbean
Sub-Saharan Africa  53  47
Source: Murray, Govindaraj, and Chellaraj 1994.
14Valuing  output.  As mentioned,  one principal  reason  why health projects  have been
exempt from formal  economic  evaluation  has been the difficulty  in valuing outputs  which entail
extensions  to life. There is a long and ultimately  unsatisfying  literature  on undertaking  this
valuation  to which  this paper will not contribute.  Some  judgment  on this value will be needed  for
an informed  decision  on public interventions  in health. A few points relevant  to practical project
evaluation  are noted here.
First, it should  be kept in mind  what it is we want valuation  for. In a sense,  all valuation
is simply  a way of aggregating  disparate  inputs  and outputs  of a project in order to get a single
number  as a measure  of its profitability.  Most  of the time prices  (shadow  or otherwise)  are the
appropriate  weights  (comparable  across  commodities)  for this adding  up. In health,  the most
visible problem  is the weight  to put on life versus  money.  However,  there are a large number  of
other kinds of outputs  within  the health sector  which do not necessarily  entail life and death but
which may be similarly  difficult  to compare.  Loss  of abilities  to perform  daily functions,  pain
and discomfort  associated  with different  diseases  and other aspects  of morbidity  for which  there
is no market mechanism  to get valuations  (it is hard to trade my backache  for three of your bouts
of the flu). Similarly,  the value (to society)  of health problems  of people  of different ages or
functions  (mothers,  say) is often  debated in this literature  - another  dimension  of aggregation.
Further,  many of the characteristics  of the output  of health systems  are themselves  not
specifically  health-related.  Time spent  traveling  (or taking  off from work)  to get to clinics,
waiting  time, courtesy  of service  provider,s  and many other  aspects  of a very personal  service  are
important  to consumers,  judging from their demand  for different services  and providers.
There is no correct solution  to the valuation  problem.  Any  method  we choose  will have
to be accepted  as arbitrary,  treated  tentatively,  and with some  degree of scrutiny.  When  we take
any one seriously,  there is usually  trouble.  For example,  it is sometimes  proposed  that the present
15discounted value of a person's income stream be used as the value of life. This is sometimes
called the "human capital" approach to valuation. The obvious fact is that retirees consider their
own life valuable and there is no reason why society should not include this consideration. It is
not obvious, either logically or ethically, why such people should be ignored in social
calculations.9
Prices are usually treated as appropriate values for aggregating commodities in a way
which is consistent with peoples' preferences. We assume that people are equating prices to their
own marginal utilities and so represent a commonly shared value. In health we are reluctant to
use market prices in the same way due to the various market failures described above. An ideal
measure of the value of different types of health outcomes would combine the personal
preferences of patients (with their own valuation of discomfort, inconvenience, life prospects and
responsibilities) with a more accurate appraisal of medical effectiveness of care. As this mixture
of knowledge - technical from the provider and personal from the patient - does not reside in
any one person, it is fundamentally unobservable.
A method which most closely approximates this perspective is the Quality Adjusted Life
Year (QALY) which is used in some OECD countries (Barnum 1995) This technique relies on
extensive interviews with people asking them to trade off certain kinds of health problems
against others. Even here, however, the number is an average and does not allow for individuals
to value things differently.
Other methods often have no way of incorporating any preferences of patients. Methods
such as Healthy Life Years Gained or Disability Adjusted Life Years (as used in the 1993 World
Development Report, World Bank) make arbitrary judgments concerning the relative weights of
9Of  course,  if an evaluation  is done using  lost human  capital as a lower  bound  for the true cost of a disease
and still shows  a project  to be worthwhile,  this approach  can be effective.  See Kim  and Benton  (1995)  for
such an application.
16different  kinds of afflictions  and the relative  social  weights  of deaths  occurring  at different ages.
Anand and Hanson  (1995)  challenge  the underlying  logic  and ethical  judgments  implicit in the
latter  measure.  Any measure  that ignores  informed  personal  preferences  (i.e. all measures)  will
have serious  limitations.
Even if we were to get a defensible  measure  of a value of life, carefully  measured  for
certain situations,  there is a further  problem  related  to making generalizations  to contexts  other
than that captured in the measurement  exercise.  A particular  consideration  is the degree  of choice
involved  in the exposure  to risks of death.  For example,  one way of empirically  estimating  the
value of life is to estimate  wage differentials  between  safe and (otherwise  comparable)  risky
professions.  Results of such studies are frequently  interesting  but care must be taken in their
interpretation.  The people in the samples  for the empirical  work  take risky  jobs voluntarily.  They
may, therefore,  be relative  risk takers and not representative  of the general  public. Even if they
are not too different  from others,  there is still the (ethical)  concern  that taking  on risk voluntarily
is of a different  kind than exposing  people  to risk without  their consent.  Thus,  people might look
at deaths  from smoking  or (less controversially)  motorcycle  racing  differently  from those from
diseases where no personal  behavior  (that  we know  of) is so clearly  the cause such as those
caused  by air or water pollution  (Viscusi 1992).
While there is no solution  to this problem,  there is no way to avoid it either. It has
sometimes  been suggested  that the problem  can be circumvented  by methods  for which no value
of life is needed.  One such proposal  is to use cost-effectiveness,  which calculates  the ratio of a
given  health impact  (the one in use at the Bank currently  is DALY's saved) by a medical
intervention  to its cost. Interventions  with lower  costs per health impact  are then said to be
preferred  and no explicit  value of life is required.  This turns out to be illusory  in many of its
proposed  applications,  in particular,  the choice  between  alternative  treatment  options in a clinical
17setting.  This is an example  of using a rate bf return  calculatioXffo  evaluate  mutually  exclusive
options  - a practice  ruled out by the standard  project  evaluation  literature  (Hammer  1993).  An
example  of how this method  can yield unacceptable  results  can be found in a paper comparing
different  treatment options  for malaria  (Sudre  et al 1992).  Alternative  program  costs and the
expected  savings  in lives  for two different  drugs are presented  in table 3.
Table  3. Costs  and effects  of alternative  treatments  for malaria
Chloroquine  Pyrimethamine-sulfadoxine
Lives saved  1382  1723
Program  cost  $1812  $2622
Cost-effectiveness  $1.31  per life saved  $1.52  per life saved
Source:  Sudre et al (1992).
The authors note  that if cost-effectiveness  were used as the criterion  for deciding  between  the
two, chloroquine  would  win out. However,  they note that given  the larger number  of lives  saved
by pyrimethamine-sulfadoxine,  there is an implicit  value of a life that would  make the two
equivalent  (solving:  [value  of life] x 1382  - 1812  = [value  of life] x 1723  -2622 or [value  of life]
= 2.38).  Therefore  they conclude  that "Chloroquine  would  be the drug of choice  only if the value
of a death prevented  were less than US$2.38  (but greater  than US$1.31)"  Not only is there an
implicit  value to life in the (supposedly  value-free)  use of cost-effectiveness  ratios  but it turns
out to be absurdly  precise  and absurdly  low.
Since  the problem  cannot  be avoided,  the best advice is to be modest  and to examine  the
logical  consequences  of alternative  valuations.  Health  effects  should  be presented  separately  (at
whatever  level of aggregation  the policy analyst  feels comfortable  with) from other outputs in
order to allow alternative  estimates  for the same  value.
18One way around the valuation of life issue is provided by the National Schistosomiasis
Control project for Egypt (World Bank 1992, Egypt). In this case, the rate of return to the project
was calculated under the following assumptions concerning the value of life. The "switching
value" which would make the project fail to pass a 10% rate of return test can be calculated and
show to be unreasonably low. This approach will not always give clear answers. Sometimes the
value of life so obtained will be within a reasonable range for such a number. At the least,
though, this could give the policy maker something to talk about.
Table 4. Rate of return to a schistosomiasis control program - Sensitivity analysis
Implicit value of a year of life  Deaths averted each year
4600  2300
US$800  40%  17%
US$600  28%  12%
US$400  18%
Source: World Bank 1992, Egypt.
Determining private sector behavior. As argued above, the fact that medical care is a
nontraded service, public production or provision (or financing) can have displacement effects in
the private sector. The consequence of this is that any estimate of improved health status to be
compared to public expenditure should be net of the displacement of private services. The size of
the effect is an empirical matter and should be a substantial part of the sector work leading up to
the project. It can be derived from the overall market structure, which should have been a central
feature of that work.
There has been a substantial amount of research in recent years on the determinants of
the demand for health care in developing countries including the substitutability of public and
private providers. While much of the emphasis has been on determining the effect of public
19sector pricing on the use of health services 1,  a growing number of studies have been done which
examine other aspects of demand which projects in health are likely to affect. A recent review by
Alderman and Lavy (1996) in this journal"  examined, among other things, the impact of
location and quality of public health facilities on utilization. Table 5 reproduces a few of the
results presented there.
Table 5. Effects of public facility characteristics on service use
Country/policy  % Change in patient
simulation  use
Self care  Public facilities  Private facilities
Ghana
Improve quality of  -3.5%  127.6  -19.5
care (infrastructure,
materials, and staff)
Reduce distance to  -2.6  95.9  -14.9
public facilities (50%)
Share of market  51%  14%  35%
Kenya
Increase drug  -4.1%  3.6%  -4.1%
availability
Reduce distance to  -1.8%  1.6%  -1.8%
public facilities (20%)
Share of market  39%  36%  25%
Source: Alderman and Lavy (1996), Ghana-  Lavy and Germain (1995), Kenya - Mwabu,
Ainsworth, and Nyamete (1995).
The policy changes listed here (a small part of the results in the original paper) are those
which could be standard project components - extending the public clinic network to new areas
or improving the (easily observable aspects of the) quality of care. Both of the types of projects
10  Early  contributions  to this literature  are Akin  et al (1985, 1986)  and Gertler  and van der Gaag (1990),  the
latter  using data from the World  Bank's Living  Standards  Measurement  Surveys.
Several  of the examples  in that  paper come  from Shaw and Ainsworth  (1995).
20in both countries could be counted on to reduce the proportions of people who self-treat (don't
visit any modem provider) which is an important achievement. However, when percentage
changes are weighted by the share of visits to each type of provider to determine how many new
users of public facilities would come from private facilities, they show that in Ghana, 38% of the
new visits to public facilities due to improved quality are attributable to reductions in visits to
private facilities as are 36% of those due to better access to public facilities. In Kenya, fully 80%
of the increase in patient use of public facilities due to better drug availability is accounted for by
the drop in private facility use. If a project were to accurately predict the increase in public
facility use due to the improvement but failed to account for the decrease in private sector use,
the benefits of the project (as some multiple of cured people, say) would be overstated by a
factor of five.
It is possible that the public sector provides better medical service than does the private
sector and this quality differential should be examined.  It is also possible that improved access
to free public facilities (in Kenya) is good for redistributive purposes. This depends on whether
the average clinic user is poorer than the average tax-payer. If public clinics are
disproportionately in urban areas and taxes come from agriculture, even this benefit is unlikely
to be realized. In either case, the analysis underpinning the project should identify the market
structure, the degree of substitutability and differences in the quality of care between public and
private sectors, and relevant characteristics of the beneficiaries (consumers) in order to assess
improvements in health care or equity.
While the demand side of the market has been analyzed in some depth, the supply of
services is less well known and market analyses combining both supply and demand are rare.
12 The interaction  of cross-price  elasticities  and differential  quality  characteristics  in the evaluation  of
public  provision  is discussed  in Hammer  (1993).
21One example of an analysis which incorporated information from both the demand and supply
sides of the market is found in Gertler and Molyneaux (1995). They estimated the impact of
public facility fees on private sector fees in an experiment performed in Indonesia and found a
close connection. Net demand changes were dependent on both prices.
Alderman and Gertler (1989) estimated the effect on demand for both publicly and
privately provided services of changing the public sector price of care in Pakistan. While there
were no data available to estimate the private sector supply response, possible net market effects
were explored by a sensitivity analysis. In their work, the total effect of raising fees in health
centers depended on the induced price rise in the private sector as both prices were determinants
of service use. In the project evaluation context, the same kind of information could be used to
examine the effect of making extra services available through the public sector (that is, with
changes in quantities provided rather than fees charged).
Since direct information on the supply response of private providers is rare (the
Indonesia study is quite unusual in that the private supply response was actually measured),
experimentation with different values in a sensitivity analysis, as in the Pakistan study is a
possible way out. The appendix of this paper gives a short-cut method for estimating the net
effect of providing a competing service publicly. There, a simplifying assumption is that new
public capacity enters the same market and has the same effect as new private capacity. If more
detailed information is available such that the new public capacity has some other effect on the
private sector, this should be included in sector work (and may well lead to interesting stories to
tell about the operation of the sector). For example, new public capacity may reduce waiting
times, and it is time wasted waiting for free public sector services which generates the demand
for private services. Whether the parameters (waiting time as determined by capacity, private
sector demand as determined by waiting time) is known with certainty or not (most likely not),
22estimates can be used to approximate the net effect of capacity. Alternatively, new facilities may
decrease travel time (which was the source of private demand). Estimates of time savings and
increased service use could be directly used in the project evaluation, combining information on
demand as a function of distance with data on the geographical distribution of potential
beneficiaries.
As the examples above make clear, corrections for the impact of substitution with a
private sector can be quite large. The degree of correction will be larger: (1) the larger is the
cross-price elasticity between public and private sectors, (2) the larger is the elasticity of supply
of the private sector and, (3) the smaller is the overall elasticity of demand for services. Since
many projects are quite long lived (expansion of clinic networks, establishing prevention
programs) the relevant elasticity of supply is likely to be the long run elasticity. This is harder to
estimate accurately but is also likely to be much larger than the short-run elasticity. In the short
run, established private sector practitioners may not move from their current location or change
the number of hours they work. With a longer time horizon, practitioners can decide to enter or
leave a local market depending on how much the public sector draws potential clients. Similarly,
potential professionals (university students) may choose to enter more profitable fields if the
medical profession becomes less attractive.
From the consumers'  side, services can differ greatly in the elasticity of demand. Several
studies have found that the price elasticity of demand for clinical care is higher among poor
people than among others (Gertler and van der Gaag 1990). Projects which are designed to reach
the poor may therefore have less of a need to adjust for displacement effects (provided that this
empirical regularity holds true in the project area). On the other hand, Pritchett (1994) finds that
the number of children a family has is highly correlated with its desired number of children and
that the demand for contraceptives is likely to be highly inelastic. The reason is that the cost of
23contraceptives is very small compared to the cost of having children. Contraceptive products are
likely to be very elastic in supply (though methods which require professional providers will
share supply characteristics of other medical services). If supply were inelastic as well, we would
note widely fluctuating prices of contraceptives. With elastic supply and inelastic demand, one
would expect very little effect of public programs of subsidizing or providing family planning
services. His empirical work confirms this expectation.'3
Another approach to the issue of determining the net outcome of projects is to estimate
the effect of previous expenditures in the public sector on health outcomes. This approach was
followed in an analysis of Malaysia and repeated for several other countries.'4 The analysis,
using a panel of regions within the countries estimates the effect of different types of public
expenditures (usually contrasting primary preventive services with subsidized curative, clinical
care) on measures of health status, controlling for income (among other things). The results for
Malaysia and the Philippines are reported in table 6.
13 Similar  results  have  been found  in Indonesia  using  very  different  types  of data. See  Pitt, Rosensweig,  and
Gibbons  (1993) and Gertler  and Molyneaux  (1994).
4 World  Bank 1992,  Malaysia.  See also World  Bank 1995,  Philippines.
24Table 6. Determinants of infant mortality
Variable  Malaysia  Philippines
Income  -1.06  -.223
(.97)  (.042)
Safe water  -.147  -.026
(.05)  (.027)
Immunization (Diptheria,  -.113  -.018
Pertussis, Tetanus -DPT)  (.04)  (.013)
Publicly employed medical  1.03
personnel per capita  (.79)
Public health expenditure  -.404
(.113)
Public health expenditure x  .041
income  (.012)
Adjusted R2  .55  .988
Standard errors in parentheses
Source. Hammer, Nabi, and Cercone (1995), Philippines Public Expenditure Review (1995).
Data and statistical technique: Malaysia-  14 provinces over 4 years (1986-89)  fixed effects
panel estimation, Instrumental variables estimation (for immunization - DPT as endogenous).
Philippines: 13 regionis  over 8 years (1983-90)  fixed effects estimation.
For Malaysia, robust results were obtained which indicated that variations in traditional
public health types of interventions (immunization and safe water provision) were highly
significant in explaining declines in infant mortality whereas public provision of clinical care
services had no effect on health status. In the Philippines, the results were less robust but in some
specifications indicated very much the same thing. However, the best fitting specification,
reproduced in the table, indicates something quite different. Here, the presence of a significant
interaction term between regional income and public health subsidies indicates that providing
services in poor areas does have an important effect on health status while providing services in
richer areas has no effect at all. The best explanation for this is that the (large) private sector
substitutes closely with the public sector in richer areas resulting in very elastic supply of private
25providers. In poor areas, public provision substantially increasing access to health care due to a
substantially less elastic private supply response. This situation can be described as in figure 1.
Figure 1. Public provision and health care markets in the Philippines
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In the context of project evaluation, for certain kinds of projects such as (some forms of)
vector control, sanitation or some types of health education and promotion activities,  the ability
to charge for specific services is impossible and there will be no private sector at all. For such
nonexcludable public goods, no correction for the displacement of services (in terms of health
improvement) needs to be done. For the kinds of services which have private sectors competing
with the public sector, the assessment of the private sector counterfactual should be routine. In
terms of substantive changes, this method is likely to lead to an increase in the priority of
population based, "public goods" projects - which have a substantial overlap with traditional
15 As mentioned  above,  the types of health  education  activities  that  satisfy  this criterion  are those which  are
not tied to the promotion  and sale of specific  commodities,  in which  case one might  expect  advertisements
or promotional  activities  on the part of the producer.  These  promotional  activities  can also be a cause of
concern  (and  needs regulation)  as evidenced  by the behavior  of manufacturers  of infant  formula  or
ineffective  medicines.
26public health interventions and lower the priority of clinic-based, patient initiated services for
which a private sector can, and almost always does, exist.
However, universal generalizations are not warranted as the case of the Philippines
illustrates. Indeed, consideration of the effect of projects on the private sector will not
necessarily reduce the value of the public investment. For example, the analysis of the health
sector in Malaysia (World Bank 1992, Malaysia) indicated the possibility that the existence of a
reliable public health service provided competition to the private sector which effectively held
down fees. This "indirect regulation" may be more effective than trying to monitor and control
many individual practitioners. The welfare improvement from the public service could not be
estimated from its own characteristics alone but needed to be understood in the context of a
fuller analysis of the industrial organization of the sector. The only general lesson (and one
which is emphasized as well in Alderman and Lavy) is that market structures in poor countries
differ substantially and predicted effects of health projects can go quite wrong if the preparatory
sector work is lacking.
HII.  Fiscal Impact,  Fees, and Projects
The third main point in DSS is that public funds for investment come at a premium due
to the distortionary effects of the taxes needed to collect them. Estimates in the literature indicate
losses on the order of 30-50%  in industrial countries and higher for less developed countries. In
many poor countries, with underdeveloped tax systems which rely heavily on export taxes on
agriculture, the distributional effects of higher taxation can make this cost even higher. This
leads to three main conclusions. First, too many projects are accepted using conventional project
evaluation methods. Second, opportunities for recovering costs in the project should be explored.
27Third, alternative methods of correcting the market failure which initially justified the project
and which may be cheaper than direct provision (or financing) should also be examined.
Regulations, partial subsidies, or even taxation may be equally effective in improving the market
outcome and could well be cheaper.
These considerations all have relevance to the health sector, though to differing degrees.
As to the first, since conventional project analysis is not commonly done in health projects, it
cannot be the source of a bias toward public provision. On the other hand, while private market
failures are sometimes mentioned as a justification for public provision, the fact that public
money comes at a premium is rarely mentioned. The public sector must be correcting market
failures in which the social value of public provision (or finance) relative to the private sector is
at least as high as the tax distortion. Whileformal  analysis has not led to any bias in favor of the
public sector in health, the lack of consideration of the cost of public funds has probably led to a
similar, though informal, bias.
The second consideration, exploring options for cost recovery, lands squarely in the
middle of a long standing controversy in the health field.16  No attempt to resolve this controversy
is made here, but a few points follow from the analysis in DSS. First, many of the services
offered in health care are private goods, whether or not they are delivered by the private sector.
That is, they can be charged for and services could be refused to nonpayers even if this is not
currently done. With a premium on public funds (or, similarly, with an overall budget constraint
for a health ministry), the two decisions as to which projects to support and how much to charge
need to be made jointly. Whether or how much to charge depends on balancing two opposing
concerns (Hammer 1993).
16 See, for example,  Creese  (1991)  or Griffin  and Shaw  (1995).
28On one hand, charging fees obviously reduces the drain on the government budget of a
given project (or, equivalently, allows a fixed budget to be stretched farther). With a premium on
public funds, cost recovery will translate into a higher priority for any given project. The ability
to avoid raising taxes while still expanding or improving services is a decided advantage.
On the other hand, raising fees in public facilities will reduce demand for publicly
provided services. The question is: what are the likely consequences of failing to get that care?
How many people would be dissuaded from seeking publicly provided care and what difference
would it make to their health?
The effect on people's health depends on a number of factors. First, do people stop
seeking treatment altogether or do they switch to health care provided by the private sector?
Related, are the health conditions which they stop seeking care for likely to be serious illnesses
or not? Second, what is the relative effectiveness of the public sector and the private sector (or
any alternative that people are taking instead of visiting public clinics)? To put it starkly: if, as a
result of higher fees, people are staying away from clinics for treatment of muscle aches and skin
rashes (a large component of demand for local hospital services in Indonesia) or are buying the
same over-the-counter treatments that they would get from the public facility, that is one thing. If
they are sitting home and dying of tuberculosis, that is quite another.
Who benefits from fee increases and how also depends on whether money collected is
retained by clinics and used to improve quality. Jimenez (1987) shows the conditions under
which the improvement in quality can outweigh the financial burden of the fees. Litvack and
Bodart (1993) demonstrate just such an effect in Cameroon and argue that poor people, in
particular, benefit in terms of overall access to services from the combined effects of fees and
quality improvements.
29Fees are least likely to harm the health status of the people under the following
circumstances:
(1) Demand for care at public facilities is inelastic - i.e., people are not dissuaded from
using public clinics due to higher fees.
(2) Demand at public facilities is elastic but people continue using facilities for more
serious conditions and stop using them for minor ailments.
(3) Demand at public facilities is elastic but private facilities are close substitutes - i.e.
the cross-price elasticity of demand is high and private supply is also elastic - meaning
that people stop using public facilities but still receive care at private clinics.
(4) Private care is effective. If the private sector is characterized by modern providers,
such as NGOs or public providers in their off hours (as is legal and standard practice, for
example, in Indonesia [World Bank 1994, Indonesia]) a shift in use from public to
private does no harm to health status. If the private sector consists of traditional healers
with no particular skills (which does not apply to all traditional healers) then increasing
demand for them is harmful.
Therefore, in order to make a judgment concerning fees, it is again necessary to know a
fair amount about the demand for services and the nature of private supply of services. As
mentioned above, such characteristics of markets as demand elasticities (sometimes with cross-
price effects) are known from research but vary substantially from country to country. Therefore,
30they cannot  be confidently  inferred  from other countries  and should  be investigated  in the
context of sector  work. Some  of these characteristics,  such as symptom-specific  demands  for
services  (which can help us understand  if people  stop using life saving  care) are not well
researched  at all and need to be examined.  Note that information  about  the cost-effectiveness  of
medical  treatments  is not part of the essential information  needed  to determine  which services
should  be provided  at subsidized  rates in the public sector.  It would show up only in regard  to the
difference  in effectiveness  between  public  and private  care.
Finally,  the high cost of public  funds implies  that more effort  be given in looking  for
policies  other than subsidized  provision  or financing  to correct market  failures.  Monitoring  and
regulating  a private sector  may be such an option  for ensuring  high standards  of care at a lower
cost to the government.  The same might  be true for private insurance.  Similarly,  if imperfect
information  is a key element  in the health market,  the provision  of information  concerning  the
quality and effectiveness  of private providers  can be an important  public role (van der Gaag
1995,  p. 25).
Unfortunately,  the information  needed  to choose  between  regulating  and providing
services  is usually  lacking.  Similarly,  the workings  of insurance  markets  in health are not
sufficiently  well known  to be able to confidently  prescribe  the appropriate  regulatory  framework.
Recent experiments  in the provision  of insurance  (Griffin  and Shaw 1995)  should shed light on
this issue but research  in the area is still in its infancy.
Is it easier to regulate  a private  sector  or to manage  a public system?  To answer  that we
need to have  a more complete  understanding  both of the workings  of the private markets  of
health care and health insurance  and of the behavior  and incentives  facing  employees  in the
government  service.  This is addressed  in the next section.
31IV. Fungibility  and Other  Issues  of Public  Servant  Behavior
Fuzgibility
DSS make the point  that the true effect of project funds  may have little  to do with the
specifics  of the project  being evaluated.  Governments  may  have intended  to do the project
anyway and the extra money  merely  allows them to finance  the project  which they consider
marginal.  Donors  may not even be aware  of the project  they are really funding,  much  less be able
to evaluate it. A great deal of the force  of this argument  comes  from the much  larger scope for
reallocations  between  rather  than within  sectors.  But there is a distinct  issue related  to possible
reallocations  within  ministries  of health. Since  the Alma  Ata conference  in 1977,  the
international  public  health community  has stressed  the need  to shift resources  toward basic
primary  care. As a result,  much  of the public  health resources  available  from donors  have been
directed  toward primary  health care. Yet when  govemments'  actual allocations  are examined,  we
find that large  portions of their budgets  go to services  which do not conform  to the primary  care
model.
Whether  the primary  care paradigm  is appropriate,  the fact that actual  allocations  differ
from it to the extent they do indicates  that decisions  of the ministries  are determined  by other
factors  such as political pressure  from providers  or affluent  consumers.  It is entirely  possible  that
governments  feel that donors' project  financing  can be counted  on to fund the basic services
(immunizations,  rural care) leaving  the ministry  to satisfy other pressures  for the provision  or
subsidy  of urban, tertiary  services.
A recent paper  (Feyzioglu  et al 1996)  analyzed  the effect of foreign aid  on public
expenditure  patterns.  Within the health sector,  they found  that while  foreign  aid to countries
earmarked  for the health sector  reduced  infant  mortality,  government's  own  resources  spent on
32health did not. This is roughly consistent with the fungibility argument since it leaves open the
possibility that governments'  allocations compensate for the preferences of donors.
If donors tend to fund items, such as primary health care, which are likely to have an
impact on infant mortality this can leave governments with the ability to fund other kinds of
health care such as hospitals or other services which are of lower priority to the donor
community. In DSS, the suggestion was made that projects be evaluated in the context of the
overall sectoral strategy or via reviews of public expenditures across the board. To the extent that
money is fungible within ministries, this focus seems warranted.
Incentives
Finally, a critical area for analysis of projects (of all kinds - not simply health) has been
lurking in the background throughout this paper: that of coming to grips with the behavior of
governments and their workers. This means understanding their goals, incentives, and
constraints. It is at the heart of the issue of "govemment failures" (the counterpoint to market
failures), fungibility, and the decision to provide rather than regulate services. Understanding the
fungibility of resources requires knowledge of the behavior of, and the incentives facing, senior
policymakers. Understanding the true impact of a project requires knowledge of the behavior of,
and the incentives facing, civil servants who will be responsible for its implementation. Deciding
between regulation and provision requires knowledge of the behavior of, incentives facing and
the relative ability to influence those incentives for both civil servants and private providers.
One general criticism can be leveled at the literature on project evaluation on this score.
While a great deal of intellectual effort has gone into defining the right prices by which to value
outputs, to a large extent, the inputs and outputs themselves (often extending well out into the
33future) are treated as given.17 It seems as if the relationship between inputs and outputs was
assumed to be a matter of simple, given, engineering parameters which could be completely
described before economists needed to get involved.
Merely assuming that project inputs will achieve their intended results without
considering the incentive structure facing those responsible for them is quite naive. The
incentives are of two kinds: (1) those specific to people in the actual construction of the project
and running of an enterprise if kept in public hands, and (2) those facing private agents (such as
farmers in an irrigation project) during the period when project benefits are reaped. The former
raises issues of ownership at the higher levels of supervision and civil service remuneration or
contracting procedures at lower levels. The latter depends on the policy framework in which the
project operates and has been the subject of numerous analyses. In a recent analysis, Pritchett
(1996) finds that the discrepancies between the value of capital as determined by accumulated
costs of investments and as determined by contribution to output (marginal productivity) varies
enormously between countries. The discrepancy is attributed to the economic environment in
which the investments were made and argues strongly against using simple input/output
relationships independent of the incentives (of both types) people working with invested capital
face.
While this criticism applies to all project evaluations, consideration of the overall
incentive structure is especially important in the health sector because of the fact that health care
is a service. As such, its value depends on maintaining incentives for continual good
17 In the UNIDO  guidelines,  one  of the original,  standard  texts in the field,  a project  evaluation  is divided
into 10 steps.  The first is: "Ascertain  the 'net output' of the project  and split it into adding  to supply  and
saving  resources"  (UNIDO  1972,  p. 50) after  which  the next nine  deal with  shadow  pricing  and the like.
Further,  much of the discussion  on the first  step concerns  the second  part of the sentence  (splitting  up the
outputs)  and almost  nothing  on the first.
34performance to the providers of that service and an analysis requires looking at those incentives
for those working in the public sector.
Just because a health clinic is built does not mean that the providers will show up for
their jobs. And if they do show up, there is no guarantee that they will devote themselves to the
care of their patients. The actual output of an investment will depend on the policies concerning
pay and other incentives for good performance in public employment. In the same way that
incentives facing people in the private sector should be examined for evidence of market failures,
so too should those in the public sector be examined for evidence of government failures. This
will give a better appraisal of what can be realistically expected from the project.
Recent analyses of public health systems point to some serious problems in this regard.
One indication of these problems is the common occurrence of bypassing of local public health
facilities for private (or higher level public) facilities even if the public service is free (Kloos
1990, Korte et al 1992, among many). There are many reasons for this but some frequently cited
factors are the lack of concern shown by the provider, social distance between medical
practitioners and their clients (exacerbated by assigning doctors to areas of different ethnic
background) and other aspects of the behavior and degree of commitment of the civil service
doctor.
Other studies (Lewis et al 1991, 1996) point to serious problems in the technical
efficiency of public hospitals and clinics. In one study in the Dominican Republic, the proportion
of expenditures that actually reached patients in the form of services was estimated to be as low
as 12%. Once again, the incentive structure, this time for hospital administrators, is at the heart
of the problem. If the financial viability of the enterprise has no impact on pay and promotion,
the quality of management is likely to suffer.
35In sector  work  on Indonesia  (World  Bank 1994,  Indonesia),  a particular  dilemma  was
identified.  On the one hand, regional  variation  in epidemiological  conditions  and the variety of
tasks expected  of public health employees  argued  for increased  local discretion  in the allocation
of resources.  On the other hand, the incentive  system in place which  allowed  doctors  to maintain
private practices  in public facilities  (in the afternoon  when  the public  facilities were closed),
raised the possibility  that this discretion  would  be used perversely,  leading  to heavier reliance  on
clinic-based  activities  to the detriment  of outreach  and population-based  public  health concerns.
Reforms  such that the remuneration  of public  providers  better served  public priorities  was
recommended.
A widely-believed  consequence  of fee-for-service  private  care is the tendency  of doctors
to over-treat,  since the doctor  gets a higher  income  the more extensive  the service  (assuming  the
lack of knowledge  on the part of the patient  can be exploited).  A fair  question  is whether  the
same doctor  on salary  will under-treat  or badly  treat if there are no financial  consequences  for
unsatisfied  customers.  Both problems  could,  in principle,  be addressed  with careful monitoring
and appropriate  sanctions.  However,  we know  very little about  governments'  relative  abilities  to
administer  the two systems  - managing  a public system  or regulating  a private  one. This is a
topic of great importance  but one beyond  the scope of this paper  (and the abilities  of the author).
V. Conclusion
Devarajan,  Squire  and Sethaput-Narueput  identify  four considerations  critical for the
evaluation  of any project. This paper  has argued  that they are particularly  appropriate  in the
health sector  and has tried to show how  they might be applied.  DSS advocate  doing the
following:
36(1) Establish  a firm  justification  for public involvement  in the sector  and project outputs.
The health sector  is characterized  by a number  of market failures  which can  justify
public  sector involvement.  However,  the existence  of imperfectly  competitive  markets
should  not be used as a talisman  to ward off economists  and to justify any intervention.
Specific  market failures  should  be identified  (which  will vary in nature  and severity in
different contexts)  and the analysis  identifying  them should  give guidance  on how to
correct  for them. Characteristic  of the sector is the inadequacy  of insurance  markets.
This should lead to analysis  of and attempts  to measure  the value of reduced  insecurity  a
project might offer to project beneficiaries.  Also important  are the existence  of services
which are either in the nature  of a true public good (pest control)  or have distinct
external  effects (infectious  disease  control).  Finally,  health projects  are often  advocated
for their role in poverty  alleviation.  This, too, should  not be an article of faith since
different  kinds of services  have  very different  distributional  characteristics.  Basic
sanitation,  hygiene,  and even education  of girls from poor families  may have greater
effect on the health of the poor than general  subsidies  to clinical  services  (a product  that
frequently  has a high income  elasticity).  It was noted  that none of these three areas: risk,
external  effects,  or poverty  alleviation  are handled  by current applications  of cost-
effectiveness  analysis.  Evaluations  should address  the degree  to which specific  market
failures  will be ameliorated  by the particular  project  - not by reference  to generalities.
(2) Establish  the counterfactual.  Any  project  must compare  the situations  which would
obtain with and without  the project.  In health,  the trick is to give a full account  of what
will happen  with the project  net of the reaction  of other actors in the health  system:
37consumers,  private providers  (including  traditional  healers),  NGOs and insurers
(including  informal  credit or private transfers).  Since  health is largely  a nontraded  good,
the participation  of the government  will affect overall  consumption  of health services
(whose  value is difficult  to determine  in money  terms).  Knowing  such features  of the
medical service  market  as demand  elasticities  (with respect  to prices  as well as other
project-manipulable  variables,  such as location  or quality  of services)  and supply
elasticities  of private providers  (particularly  with regard  to price or the existence  of a
competitive  public  sector) is critical in being able  to establish  this reaction.
(3) Determine  the fiscal impact  of the project. A premium  on public  money  due to the
need  to raise money  in taxes should  lead to a search  for alternatives  to subsidized
provision.  In health,  the setting  of fees for clinical services  is most important  area in
which this issue  arises. This paper  argues that higher  subsidies  should  go to services
which have  higher  social returns  relative  to private  returns and, of those which warrant
subsidy,  to those with more elastic  demand.  We should  know  when  we do damage  by
raising  prices (in highly  price elastic  services)  and when  we can conserve  money  for
other high priority  needs by charging  fees (in services  with low price elasticities).
(4) Acknowledge  the fungibility  of project resources.  This paper has argued  that the
issue of fungibility  of project  funds is part of a much broader  issue of the need to
understand  the behavior  (motivation  and incentives)  of public  servants.  The motives  of
high level public servants  affect the fungibility  of project funds  as in DSS. In health,  this
is likely to be an issue if donor  funds  earmarked  for primary  health care free up domestic
funds for services  on which  those donors  would  place low priority.  More fundamental,
38however,  is understanding  the incentives  to civil servants  or to contractors  to the
government  for the provision  of high quality,  responsible  care. Virtually  all projects
assume  that project inputs  are used  appropriately  and that the output  (at least in terms of
numbers  of patients  seen at some assumed  level of quality) is, therefore,  known.  In the
analysis  of services,  in particular,  this assumption  is not valid and the incentive  structure
of those charged  with delivering  services  should  be a much  larger focus  for analysis  and
research.
The overall  conclusion  of DSS and this paper is that a great deal of the analysis  relevant
to projects should  be done prior to project  evaluation  stage.  Indeed,  with the issue  of fungibility
and incentives  given  due respect,  the best form of intervention  by donors  may  not be via
traditional  projects  at all but rather through  general loans  with conditions  related  to overall sector
strategy and reform.  If a standard  project is done,  however,  a fair amount  of information  from
supporting  sector  work is needed  before  evaluation.  In particular,  if clinical  services  (or anything
that requires  the participation  of the public)  are part  of the project,  the supply  and demand  for
substitute  services  is needed.  Just as shadow  exchange  or wage rates for project  evaluation  were
to be derived  from supporting  economic  work  that was  not part of the specific  project, so too
should  the market structure  of health be part of background  work.
Since  adequate  market analyses  are quite rare in developing  countries,  what should
project evaluation  look like before  such information  becomes  available?  It's hard to say. We
should  be taking the collection  of this information  seriously.  In the meantime,  projects  can be
designed  to focus on the key market failures  that such research  is likely  to uncover.  We know
that traditional public  health activities  are often  true public  goods  or address  genuine
externalities.  Evaluations  of these activities  will not be much  affected  by more  detailed  market
39analysis  and we can go easy on them. For projects  in which poverty  alleviation  is an important
motivating  factor, we should  ensure  that project  beneficiaries  are, in fact, the poor. Unless  by
geographic  placement  or other means  of encouraging  use by the poor and discouraging  use by
others, health care should  be used with care as a redistributive  device.  For other  projects  with
large clinical  components,  a little more  caution is needed.  Without  knowing  much  about  the
market in which the government  will enter or the incentive  structure  for public  providers,  it is
hard to know  what health effects  (or even service  use) will come  about  as a result of the project.
This should  be the focus of future  analyses  of the sector  and a source of doubt on the part of
project evaluators.
40Appendix:  Assessing  the impact  of additional  public  provision
Information  about  how the public and private sectors  interrelate  can come in a variety of
forms and it is not possible  to anticipate  every possible  way of incorporating  that information.
Good sector  work need  not be standardized  but should  be able to provide  some guesses  at the
relevant information.  Here are two examples  of how  to estimate  the weight  on project outputs  to
use in getting  the net impact  of provision.
Case one: close substitution  between  public  and private sectors.  In this case,  the following  model
is relevant:
S-v(Pv  ; Z) +  Sb  = D(PV  ;X)
where: S, = private supply
Sb=  public supply
D  market  demand  (indifferent  between  sources)
Pv= private sector price
Z = other determinants  of private  supply
X  other  determinants  of demand  for health care
It is easy to show that the net impact  on total services  rendered  as a result  of a unit increase  in
available public supply  is:
41dD/dSb =  ED/  (ED - Oy  *  ES)
where  S,D  = elasticity  of supply,  demand
0, = share of demand  (visits) provided  by private sector
Case two: not-so-close  substitution  between  public  and private sectors.  In this case the effect on
private supply  is:
dD, IdSb = (-a Dv  /aSb)/  (ED - ES)  * Dv
which must be added  to the direct change  in public service,  dSb  .
T1he  advantage  of assuming  case one is that you don't need  to know  about  direct substitution
parameters  (and therefore  there is one less number  to invent).  The advantage  to case two is that if
you do know  the degree  of substitutability  from, say, directly  estimated  demand  equations,  then
you can incorporate  this information  directly.
It is true that little is known about  some of these parameters,  particularly  those related  to supply
responses  of the private sector.  It is a shame  that such standard  economic  analysis  has been
neglected  for the calculation  of technical cost-effectiveness  coefficients  - of no direct use in
policy  analysis  for the sector.
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